written in a style as ancient as the draftsman's learning permits. It is like the habit which made lawyers write pleadings in French and Latin long after these languages had ceased to be current. 9 The jargon which results is not of course the language of present day Congressmen. Most of them probably feel more like Maury Maverick, who in his famous attack on "gobbledygook" threatened to shoot at sunrise any federal employee who should give him any more of it."°T he jargon has to be translated to Congressmen so that they can vote understandingly on the bills. Accordingly, a well-drawn committee report contains a full paraphrase of the statute, in shorter sentences and simpler terms, for the Congressmen to read.
A good example of the translation procedure can be found in the House Report on the recent Administrative Procedure Act. Since this Act is one of the more readable works of the Seventy-Ninth Congress, the difference between the official text and the paraphrase is not vast. It is just enough to indicate the difference between something meant to be read by lawmakers and something to be read by Supreme Court judges. A paragraph of the bill is given below on the left with its paraphrase on the right:"
The Act There shall preside at the taking of evidence (1) the agency, (2) one or more members of the body which comprises the agency, or (3) one or more examiners appointed as provided in this Act; but nothing in this Act shall be deemed to supersede the conduct of specified classes of proceedings in whole or in part by or before boards or other officers specially provided for by or designated pursuant to statute. The functions of all presiding officers and of officers participating in decisions in confo-mity with section 8 shall be conducted in an impartial manner.
The Paraphrase
The hearing must be held either by the agency, a member or members of the board which comprises it, one or more examiners, or other officers specially provided for in or designated pursuant to other statutes.
All presiding and deciding officers are to operate impartially.
Because of the system of obscure bills accompanied by simpler committee reports, there are usually two versions of each law that passes Congress. The draftsman likes to imagine that when the statute gets into court, the obscure official version will be applied by the judges, and the simpler paraphrase disregarded. But modem judges show a great inclination to disregard the official language and apply the version that Congress consciously agreed to.
12
So the draftsman's sublety ends by defeating itself. Instead of controlling judicial rulings by his artfully drawn clauses, he simply causes the judges to rely on the legislative record, over which he has less control. Opposing factions pack the legislative record with conflicting statements, each favoring a particular interpretation."a A better way for the draftsman to approach his objectives would be to-write the statute itself in language he expects a Congressman to read. There would then be no reason for committees to prepare a different text for law-makers to read, nor for judges to suppose that Congress-12. See Radin, Statutory Interpretation (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 863. Some examples of judicial reference to legislative intention are given infra notes 32, 34,36.
13.
A recent e.xample of conflicting legislative history is furnished by the Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 404, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 11, 1946) . The Attorney General, anxious to show that the Act did not expand the right to judicial review, declared that the section on right to review "reflects existing law." His statement ,;as printed in the Senate Report (SEN. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) 44) , and read by Senator McCarran, sponsor of the bill, on the floor of the Senate (92 Cong. Rec., Mar. 12, 1946 Mar. 12, , at 2195 .
Senator Austin, anxious to show that the Act broadened the right of review, induced Senator McCarran to assent to statements which were substantially contradictory, in this colloquy:
SENATOR AusTrN. Is it not true that among the cases cited by the distinguished Senator were some in which no redress or no review vas granted, Eolely because the statute did not provide for a review? SENATOR McCARRAN. That is correct. SENATOR AusTIN. And is it not also true that... this bill is brought forward for the purpose of remedying that defect and providing a review to all persons who suffer a legal wrong or wrongs of the other categories mentioned?
SENATOR McCARRAN. That is true; the Senator is entirely correct in his statement. (92 Cong. Rec., Mar. 12, 1946 Mar. 12, , at 2195 In this passage, Senator Austin's statements are not directed to the question of whether the bill should be passed, but to building a legislative history to influence its interpretation after it should become law.
A less direct conflict exists between statements of the Attorney General and of Congressman Walter on statutes precluding judicial review. The former emphasized that a statute which does not in terms preclude review may "be interpreted as manifesting a congressional intention to preclude review." (SEn. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., lst S&Ks. (1945) 44). The latter contended that, "Legislative intent to forbid judicial review must be, if not specific and in terms, at least clear, convincing, and unmistakable .... The mere fact that Congress has not expressly provided for judicial review would be completely immaterial. . . ." (92 Cong. Rec., May 24, 1946, at 5759) . Again, both the Attorney General and the Congressmen were packing the record of "legislative intent" rather than telling legislators how to vote.
men really understood the law to mean something it does not say. The statute itself should be as detailed, concrete, and simple as the writer would want to be if he were explaining the law personally to the men who are to vote on it. So far, we have been discussing cases where the draftsman has been obscure because he was thinking of the judge who would interpret the law, and overlooked the Congressmen who must vote on it. There are also cases where the draftsman is thinking very much about the Congressmen and wants to prevent their discovering what is involved. Sir Courtenay Ilbert, former legislative counsel to the British Parliament, tells without embarrassment of an instance where he used this method in order to sidestep a stormy issue that was being saved for a later date.
14 Examination of a 1941 amendment to the Trading with the Enemy. Act 1' suggests that an American draftsman was there trying the same thing. This was an amendment to section 5 of the Act, which had been used by the Treasury for control of foreign exchange transactions. Almost hidden in it was a long sentence giving the President powers to "vest" foreign property-a subject previously dealt with in another section of the Act, and under the more revealing term, "seize." 10 Four years later, the government contended that this amendment had repealed by implication other sections of the Act that gave remedies to American citizens. The argument was plausible enough on the face of the statute, but the Supreme Court overruled it." Mr. Justice Burton, who had been a member of the Senate when the law was passed, wrote a long concurring opinion to explain that Congress meant to leave untouched the rights of citizens which other sections of the law protected.
THE LAW AND THE CITIZEN
The citizens who have to obey the laws-or possibly go to prison for their violations-have been even more neglected by draftsmen than have the legislators. A cursory examination of most laws is enough to persuade a reader that they can hardly be understood by the laymen who are bound by them. To this there may now be added a virtual demonstration.
A series of experiments by Dr. Rudolph Flesch has made it possible to determine quite definitely the readability of various kinds of writ- [Vol. 56.:458 ing.18 Through tests of a large number of adult readers, he devised a scale for grading passages with scores running from zero upward. From 0 to 1, for example, is the level of comic strips, which can be easily read by people with a fifth grade education. From 3 to 4, which Dr. Flesch calls "standard," can be easily read by high school students. This is the level of Readers' Digest and Tim. From 5 to 6 is the level of academic journals and quarterlies, which can be easily read by college graduates. Anything above 6, according to these observations, can be easily read by practically no one, and cannot be understood, even with effort, by most people who lack a college education.
On Dr. Flesch's scale, most statutes register a score over 10-several degrees above the comprehension of average college graduates. Since only about five percent of the population have a college education, laws are unintelligible to a large proportion of the people who are supposed to obey them. In fact, they are probably beyond the understanding of nearly everyone except the lawyers who make their living by interpreting them.
This state of affairs is not hard to explain. Bentham thought it arose because jurists would rather hang a man for his misdeeds than warn him in advance against committing them." But no such sinister explanation is necessary. The fact is that legal science has consisted in studying the effect of laws on the decision of appellate cases. Draftsmen schooled in this system naturally fx their eyes on the judge of the highest court.
It seems evident that there are tremendous advantages to be gained from writing laws so that citizens can understand them. We know that it would be impossible to police all the business enterprises in the country. The state cannot, for example, fine or enjoin each enterprise that follows any of the practices supposed to constitute "restraint of trade." If illegal practices axe to cease, business men must be able to understand which of their practices are illegal. But the language of the Clayton Act is quite inadequate to inform the average business man that he must, for example, abandon basing-point pricing.! A portion of one of Bentham's sentences on this point deserves reproduction: "... . whosoever they be to whom it is a mattei of satisfaction that men should be put to death in due course of law (and these, more especially among English judges and other English lawyers, are many), the greater the extent to which they can keep from each man's mind the knowledge of such portions of law to which, on pain of being put to death for disobedience, they are called upon to pay obedience, the greater the extent to which they can administer this satisfaction to their minds. .. ."
20. The Robinson-Patman amendment to the Clayton Act provides that "it shall ba unlawful . ..to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality.... ." 49 STAT. 1526 (1936) , 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1940) . In 1945, the Su-1947] The advantages of making laws understandable was brought home most effectively to the Office of Price Administration, which started out to write its regulations in the strictest tradition of legalistic obscurity. 21 It was soon embarrassed by a Supreme Court decision refusing to enjoin violations by a Washington department store which showed that it was employing twenty-eight clerks in an effort to apply the price regulations. 22 Fortunately, Professor David F. Cavers had already persuaded the agency to try writing its regulations in a down-toearth style 23 which some commentators called "pidgin English." 24 A large number of merchants, OPA concluded, were willing to obey the law if they knew what it was. But if they could not understand the regulations, they would run their businesses to suit themselves. What was true for OPA regulations is equally true for a great many statutes.
To the argument for intelligible laws, it is sometimes answered that citizens do not read laws anyway. Chicken thieves, for example, do not steal from ignorance of the larceny statutes. That argument is perfectly good for the class of common law crimes which merely codify the Ten Commandments. It is not true for the great mass of legislation which is on the statute books today. preted. 2 -To this contention, it should be enough to reply that in fact many citizens do not. What is more important, they can not. A business man must make hundreds of decisions about competitive practice without waiting for opinions of his general counsel. If he cannot grasp the rule he is meant to follow, he will follow the rule that appeals to him and hope it is right. Moreover, if a business man's lawyer can translate a law into terms that a business man can understand, a draftsman should be able to do the same. He will save time and expense for citizens when he does.
THE LAw AND THE PUBLIc OFFICIAL
Laws must also be read and understood by the public officials who have to apply them and enforce them. These are the only people concerned with a considerable portion of the statutory law-the portion that tells how the various departments of government shall be run, who shall appoint their employees, and what they shall be paid.
Public officials are also some of the most important readers of the other kinds of laws, which tell citizens what they must do and refrain from doing to keep out of court. Police, detectives, and inspectors have to know what conduct has been forbidden before they can crack down on violators. Officials who issue licenses and assess taxes have to understand the categories in which licenses should be granted and taxes imposed.
Many public officials have just as hard a time understanding statutes as do many citizens. That is one reason why they are bound to fasten on mechanical interpretations that irk the citizen or provoke needless litigation. It is also a reason why they apply their personal standards of justice instead of applying the law. Not infrequently, the results are better than if they tried to follow the letter of the law as they understand it.
It is only a partial solution to fill public offices with lawyers, or vith men who have taken a night law course. Often the job needs a good accountant, an engineer, or a social worker. But if it gets the specialist it needs, it gets a man who has trouble understanding the laws. More often it gets a poorer specialist than it needs, or no specialist at all, in order to get a man who can make out the law or is willing to ignore it.
Neither is it a solution to provide every official with a legal adviser. The man who makes the decisions should not only be told the law; he should understand it.
THm LAw AND Tm JuDGEs At last we reach the men for whom most laws are consciously written -the judges. When a draftsman labors over a nascent bill, it is the 25. See Carter, The Provinces of the Written and the Unwritten Law (1890) 24 Aui. L. REv. 1. 1947] judge who is nearly always in his mind. Treatises and casebooks are filled with examples of how judgesconstrued ill-fated laws in the past. These are the precedents which guide draftsmen in conceiving the illfated laws of the future.
The draftsman's preoccupation with the judge is evidenced in a hundred ways. Sometimes it appears in the form of the law, which says that taking money from the employer's coffer "shall be deemed" (by the judge, obviously) to be embezzlement, and that the malefactor "shall be punishable" (by the judge) with one to ten years' imprisonment. A draftsman who was thinking about influencing the conduct of citizens would tell them that "employees must not" take money from the coffer, and that if they do they "will be punished."
In other laws, concentration on the judge is evidenced more subtly, but just as surely. A sentence a page long, winding up in a string of provisos, is no tool for telling either citizens or officials what has been forbidden. It is a tool, the draftsman hopes, for putting the judge in a box where he can rule only one way. One of the lesser reasons why this kind of drafting is bad is that the judge is the last man to read any statute. It must first be read by the legislators, and accepted by them. It must then be read, or exposed for reading, by citizens. If the law is understood and obeyed by the citi-' zens, it need never be re-read by anyone else. If it is disobeyed, the public official has his turn at reading the law, deciding whether the citizen has disobeyed it, and catching him in the infraction.
Only after all these other stages have been passed does the law ordinarily come to the judge. 2 This alone is a reason for writing so that some of the earlier parties may comprehend.
To this argument, the traditional draftsman will respond that it does no good for legislators, citizens, and officials to comprehend if judges, in the end, will misconstrue. This response reveals the crux of the whole question, which is the peculiar views about judges that underlie traditional drafting. The judge, according to a widely held superstition, is a man determined to thwart the intention of legislators by twisting every sentence from its normal meaning. But if you tie each word firmly enough to the next one, according to this bit of scriveners' 148. This is a reaction against the belief of Napoleonic times that codification would make professional interpretation unnecessary. But the objective of making judicial conduct more predictable is perfectly consistent with the objective of making law more available to laymen and lawyers alike. See Field, Codification (1886) 20 Al. L. R V. 1.
27. Declaratory judgment actions may bring the law up for interpretation before an infraction, but only if citizens have found its meaning doubtful.
[Vol. 56:458 lore, the judge cannot get out of the trap and must sentence the defendant.
Cases of a past century furnish some apparent examples of this kind of judicial conduct. There is the case of the English statute which prescribed a penalty--"if any person or persons shall wantonly and cruelly beat, abuse, or ill-treat any horse, mare, gelding, mule, ass, ox, cow, heifer, steer, sheep, or other cattle." A defendant was charged under this law with conducting a bull-fight. The judge let him off, ostensibly because "bull" was not in the list of animals, and the judge would not construe "other cattle" to include something not listed. 2 Then there is the judge who reversed a conviction for rape because the indictment concluded "against the peace and dignity of State," instead of "against the peace and dignity of Mhe State." The constitution, the judge pointed out, required indictments to conclude in a certain form, and he was bound by the constitution.0 A trial lawyer who lost an argument in a case like this would probably conclude that the judge had a bad breakfast, or that he enjoyed bullfighting. But office lawyers prefer the conclusion that if lists were more complete and exceptions more explicit, the judges' conduct would become more predictable. So statutory style becomes (to paraphrase Lord Thring) 3D a wordy cairn, on which each practitioner must from time to time throw a new word, until the whole becomes a huge heap of unintelligibility.
In the battle of wits between apparently whimsical judges and ever more diligent draftsmen, victory went always to the judges. They had the last word. When exclusio unius would not work, noscitur a sociis could always be brought to play. Today, it is clear that judges are not prisoners of language and do not even pretend to be. 3 Markham v. Cabell, 3 2 recently decided by the Supreme Court, will illustrate. Markham, the Alien Property Custodian, had seized the property of an enemy national who owed money to Cabell. The law, enacted in World War I, permitted creditors to sue the Custodian, but added: "... nor in any event shall a debt be allowed under this section unless it was owing to and owned by the claimant prior to October 36 The statute in that case forbade prepaying the passage of an immigrant employee. Holy Trinity Church had plainly violated the letter of the law by prepaying the passage of a British divine who was to be the church's pastor. The Supreme Court concluded, however, that the statute was intended to prevent glutting the market for lowwage labor, not to keep down the supply of professionals.
One may even question whether the judge who decided the case of the bull-fight 11 was quite as mechanical as he pretended to be. In modern terms, he might have said that he thought Parliament was contemplating the evil of animal beating; that he would want much clearer evidence to show that they meant to forbid sporting events. But it was easier to base his conclusion on a missing word, and so he chose that mechanical way out. To the thinking of that day, which took words more seriously than we do now, this was perhaps the more plausible justification.
Today, judges do not even pretend to make a mechanical application of the words of statutes. They much prefer to discover and apply the purposes of statutes. Under these circumstances, the concatenations of words which delighted old time draftsmen are worse than lost labor. They oblige the judges to guess at the main purpose of the law, instead of finding it clearly stated. They insure that the judges will look out-34. 154 F. (2d) 101 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946) side, instead of inside, the law to find the rules they should apply to particular situations.
A RESTATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES
The tricks that make a law easy to understand are countless. Many of them are as subtle as the touches that make good style in essays, short stories, and every other kind of literary creation. What is essential is that the writer should really want his readers to understand what is commanded and what is forbidden by the law. His object is different from that treated in books on composition, which seek an appeal to the cultivated literary taste; they strive for a certain sophistication and subtlety which may mystify while it charms.
The law-writer's object is more like that of the man who vrites directions on how to use a Kodak or how to operate a Burroughs calculator. He may be addressing a very alert and eager audience, but he wants to be understood with as little effort as possible. And he wants above all to prevent his reader from throwing down the directions in disgust.
How technical he will be should depend on his audience. A statute on judicial procedure may properly use phrases that lawyers alone can comprehend, and sentences as complex as those in legal treatises and law reviews. 38 But there is no excuse for using sentences which he would be ashamed to put in a bar association committee report, addressed to the same audience.
Postal Laws on restraint of trade should be pitched to the reading level of average business men. The draftsman of a law like the RobinsonPatman Act should ask himself whether it would make a good circular to the buyers of a large merchandising organization like Sears Roebuck. If it would not, it is a poor device for inducing business men to change their ways of buying and selling.
Internal Revenue laws and regulations may be pitched to several different levels. Those which apply to small individual incomes need to be on a very simple level. The excess profits tax law, on the other hand, had every reason to be more complex; it would be used almost exclusively by accountants. But there was no excuse for writing it in 38. This article is not intended to be as simple as most statutes should be. It is meant for lawyers, while most laws are to be read by laymen. 
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. 47] such terms that a bulletin of several hundred pages had to be issued to tell the accountants how to apply it." The text which the accountants could read should have been the text of the law.
While many of any draftsman's problems are unique, he has others which have confronted scores of draftsmen before him. For these, standard techniques can be evolved and copied from one law to another. Some of these problems are discussed in the paragraphs that follow.
WH[AT THE ACT Is ABOUT
The first thing that any law-reader wants to know is what the law is about. Does it affect him or doesn't it? Most laws fail so utterly to answer this question that they are likely to be thrown in the waste basket before the reader even tries to decipher them.
A typical example is the Trading with the Enemy Act, 4 ' which in time of war suddenly applies to tens of thousands of Americans. But if it came in the mail to an American who was about to send some money to a foreign creditor, he would have to parse two or three pages before he found out whether he was likely to be affected by it.
The first thing the citizen would notice is that the Act begins with section 2 (maybe section 1 got lost, he thinks). Where an act is addressed chiefly to public officials, rather than to citizens, the important thing is to set out the moving purpose behind the statute. The Employment Act of 1946 15 (originally proposed as the Full Employment Act of 1945) starts with a declaration of the national "policy and responsibility" to provide for employment through free enterprise. This tells the purposes with which the later sections (which can never provide for all eventualities) should be carded out.
GumE Lnms
Another simple means of enticing the reading public into the heart of a statute is to put headings on the various subdivisions. A citizen who tackles an official print of the Trading with the Enemy Act to find out which if any of its provisions affects him finds tventy-five section number; e.g., 50 U. S. C. App. § 1 (1940) . But the statutes at large, and the official government reprints circulated for information of the public, are in the original form.
43. See notes 21-3 supra. 44. Maximum Price Regulation 580, Retail Ceiling Prices for Certain Apparel and House Furnishings- § la, 10 FED. REG. 3015 (1945) . 45. Pub. L. No. 30,79th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 20, 1946 (f) Exemptions.
(1) Governmental exemption.
(2) Exemption of members of military and naval service."
The technique to which the Bureau of Internal Revenue has been driven by its thousands of statutory sections would be no less useful in a great many smaller legislative masses. Yet the great majority of bills entering the legislative hopper, and of statutes leaving it, are as devoid of subdivision headings as the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917. [Vol. 56 -458
NEW WAYS TO WRITE LAWS CUTTING OUT THE JARGON
One of the things that annoys readers in legal writing is the tireless repetition of words that do not need to be repeated. "Such," "aforesaid," and "hereinbefore" are the most familiar offenders." 2 The argument for them is that they eliminate any possible doubt that the person meant is the same one who was meant before. But it is quite certain that people read stories, articles, and even legal treatises which are not filled with "such," "aforesaid," and "hereinbefore." They do not misunderstand. Laymen find legal documents hard to read precisely because of this strenuous struggle against ambiguity. The only justification for these terms is the myth about the perverse judge who will misinterpret the law by pretending to misunderstand it. Once we have decided that we have to trust the judge anyway, we can do away with these backward-looking modifiers. When we mean the same person as before, we can simply say "the person." -9
"Such" and its companions can be got rid of simply by dropping them. A slightly harder problem is presented when the law-writer has to use two or three different terms, and finds himself repeating them again and again like leit-motifs in a Wagnerian opera. Here is an example of this fault, with one of the recurrent themes put in italics, and the other in capitals: erty. The effect will be the same as for any other transfer. 'Filing' includes registering and recording; 'transfers' include conveyances and assignments; 'property' includes patents, copyrights and trademarks."
SHORT SENTENCES
One of the hardest things for a lawyer to do is to write short sentences. Here is an example of a lawyer-like sentence, from an OPA regulation on work clothing: "Any tax upon, and incident to, the sale or delivery of staple work clothing, imposed by any statute of the United States or statute or ordinance of any state or subdivision thereof, shall be treated as follows in determining the seller's maximum prices for staple work clothing, and in preparing the records of such seller with respect thereto:
(2) In all other cases, if, at the time the seller determines his maximum price, the statute or ordinance imposing such tax does not prohibit the seller from stating and collecting the tax separately from the purchase price, and the seller does state it separately, the seller may collect, in addition to the maximum price, the amount of the tax actually paid by him or an amount equal to the amount of tax paid by any prior vendor and separately stated and collected from the seller by the vendor from whom he purchased and in such case the seller shall not include such amount in determining the maximum price under this Maximum Price Regulation No. 208." 52
Here is how OPA wrote a similar provision after it had decided it wanted citizens to understand: "The ceiling prices determined under the pricing rules in section 7 are your ceiling prices exclusive of tax. If the tax law permits the tax to be separately stated, you may charge or collect the tax on the sale or delivery of the article in addition to the ceiling price fixed under the pricing rules: Provided, that you state the tax separately. This applies, however, only to a tax on a particular sale or delivery such as a sales tax or a compensating use tax. You may separately state the tax by any method you choose, except that the Retail Federal Excise Tax on fur-trimmed articles and certain items of leather goods and other articles imposed by the Revenue Act of 1943 must be stated as provided in Supplementary Order 85." 3 Some of the explanation for the failings of the earlier draftsman lies in the same old story. He was thinking of some judge who might let off a chiseler if there were any break between the idea that the tax could be [Vol. 56.-458 added and the restriction to speciaL kinds of taxes. He was not thinking at all about the country storekeeper who would have to make sense out of the whole provision.
But the principal explanation for lawyers' labyrinthian sentences is more ironic. It is their passion for brevity. Most sentences start short, and grow longer as each member of a legislative committee adds ideas. After a couple of additions, the sentence needs to be split into two. Any draftsman would split it in a letter, but not in a statute, because that would make him repeat the subject and verb. The statute appears to take less space in one sentence than in two.
What the draftsman forgets is that the reason for brevity is to avoid tiring the reader. Most readers find one sentence of eighty wiords more tiring than five with twenty each. The thing to keep down is not the number of lines of type, but the reading time. The easier the style, as Readers' Digest knows, the shorter the reading time.
GIVING E~xAPLES
Another tradition which discourages citizens from reading laws is the draftsman's habit of describing his subject in the least specific terms he can find. An example of this approach is furnished by a bill in the last Congress which provided, "That hereafter, except as otherwise specially provided by Act of Congress, no action for the recovery of wages, penalties or other damages, actual or exemplary, pursuant to any law of the United States shall be maintained in any court unless the same was commenced within one year after such cause of action accrued: . . ." 51
The only way a lawyer can know whether the one-year limitation of this law applies is to search the United States Code from stem to stern: If he can't find a limitation anywhere else, then this is it.
A catch-all limitation may be a good thing, just to cover the unknown and forgotten cases. But this wasn't that kind of a law. The draftsman knew precisely what actions he wanted to limit, and he listed them, with citation, in the Committee report. If he had listed them in the statute, he would have saved hours of research for thousands of lawyers. Why didn't he? Possibly he prided himself on the brevity of his product, occupying a minimum of space in the Statutesat-Large, but consuming a maximum of other lawyers' time and making it likely that some would be misled until, on an appeal, a more resourceful opponent produced the Committee Report and showed what the legislators really "intended." More likely, he did not think at all. He simply followed the legal tradition of using vague, general terms instead of specific ones. If the draftsman had wanted to enlighten his reader, he would have written- "The following actions must be brought within one year after the cause of action accrued:
(1) Suits for treble damages based on infringement of a registered trademark (17 U.S.C., § 25); (2) Suits based on infringment of copyrights (17 U. S. C., § 25) ;" and so on down the list.
Later in the same bill occurs another provision of unenlightening vagueness:
"Provided further, That no liability shall be predicated in any case on any act done or omitted in good faith in accord with any regulation, order, or administrative interpretation or practice, notwithstanding that such regulation, order, interpretation, or practice may, after such act or omission, be amended, rescinded, or be determined by judicial authority to be invalid or of no effect."
No doubt a lawyer can sit down and figure out some of the situations to which this provision might apply, but they are not immediately evident. A layman would be unlikely to figure them out at all.
The reason for leaving the reader in the dark is not the difficulty in explaining the situations, for they were very lucidly set forth in the Committee Report:
"A good illustration arises from the operation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. An employer who violates the provisions of this law relating to wages or hours may be subjected to suit for twice the amount involved together with costs and attorney fees. The application of this law has been greatly extended by administrative regulations. As a result an employer who may have, in good faith, relied upon a certain ruling, regulation, or practice, suddenly finds himself confronted with many suits, when a change is made either by the Administrator or by the courts. The enforcement of this new liability dating back to the enactment of the law would in many cases bankrupt the employer." 55 This problem cannot be solved, like the preceding one, by listing the situations where the law applies, because they are innumerable. If the draftsman were to say "no liability shall be predicated in the following situations-," and list only some of them, he would run the danger of implying that it does exist in the other situations.
But there is a simple solution. Give an example and call it an example. Below is a passage from an OPA regulation where a hard-to-read legal provision is given concreteness by an illustration of how it works: What the citizen wants to know is not how to get in jail but how to stay out. It seems more logical to him to say "Persons must not do such and such." This is the style of the Ten Commandments, which are good examples of direct speech to the common citizen.
In'complex laws, this oblique approach of the law-writer is a real obstacle to understanding. Consider, for example, the confusion of the ordinary taxpayer if he had to figure out his income tax by reading the Internal Revenue Code and regulations. Fortunately, he does not even attempt it. Hd reads the form and the instructions. And this is all the Bureau of Internal Revenue expects him to do. 1 7 , Since that is what the Bureau expects, a sensible internal revenue law would ask him to do just that: "Every person who received more than $500 in a year, and not more than $3000, must fill out form 1041 A, according to the instructions that go with it. He must also pay the tax which is shown by the form, when properly completed. and so on. But this particular section will be used only by bookkeepers and accountants, so the draftsman could have said more briefly:
The taxpayer must include in his gross income an amount A which he calculates as follows:
(1) Find the fraction of the entire taxable year which had elapsed on the "last day" described above, and call itf. (2) Find the undistributed supplement P net income of the company for the entire taxable year, and call it P. (3) Multiplyf times P. The product is the amount A.
THE REST OF THE JOB
Knowing how to write readable laws will not make citizens read laws.
It will only open the way for other changes which must be made before the goal is reached.
For one thing, the job of law-writing must be delegated. It is a specialty, as good journalism is a specialty. The effect of a group of legislators amending a law around a table is the same as the effect of a lot of executives amending an advertising slogan around a table. They should make their suggestions, but the job of working them into the product should be left to the specialist."
This does not mean that law-making must be delegated. The same thing happens in administrative agencies as in legislatures when policymaking officials take over the writer's pen. It means that amendments by law-makers should be directions to the draftsman, and the draftsman should knit them into the law or regulation.
After laws are written, they must be publicized. It is not enough to put laws in a statute book where a diligent attorney, aided (when the law is months or years old) by a compiler's index, may discover them. Ways must be found of bringing them to the attention of the people who are supposed to obey them.
Administrative agencies usually recognize this need. They send out 64. ILBERT, THE MECHANICS OF LAW MAKING (1913) 14 quotes the following from Sir Frederick Pollock: "Many an Act of Parliament, originally prepared with the greatest care and skill, and introduced under the most favourable circumstances, does not become law till it has been made a thing of shreds and patches hardly recognisable by its author, and to any one with an eye for the clothing of ideas in comely words no less ludicrous an object than the ragged pilgrims described by Bunyan: 'They go not uprightly, but all awry with their feet; one shoe goes inward, another outward, and their hosen out behind; there a rag and there a rent, to the disparagement of their Lord. At the same time, laws need to be consolidated. Related laws should be combined, duplications eliminated, and all put in better order c l
The present mass of statutes is almost as forbidding as the mass of cases which, a century ago, awoke the drive for codification of the unwritten law. Today it is the written law itself that needs to be codified.
CONCLUSION
Laws should be written with more emphasis on making readers understand what the law commands, and with less emphasis on controlling the judges by rigid grammatical constructions. Judges are more likely to be controlled by clear statements of purpose.
Many ways of making laws more readable are already in use. They should be brought into the open, to be more widely adopted if valid and abandoned if unsound. The law needs a literature on how to write laws that is not contained in present treatises on statutory interpretation. J. 194, 199-200. 
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